Rendell shafts the young

Created: February 6th, 2007 | Written By: fester

Okay, so the Post-Gazette is reporting that Governor Rendell is looking to bump up the state sales tax on the current range of taxable goods by 1% point, to 6%. Allegheny County and Philadelphia County will see their sales taxes move to 8% as each county has an independent 1% tax on the same list of taxable goods. So what are the policy and political implications?

The Pittsburgh Post Gazette gives us some details on what Governor Rendell wants to do with the additional revenue:

Increasing the sales tax to 7 percent statewide — and 8 percent in Allegheny and Philadelphia counties — would generate $1.4 billion in new funds.

Mr. Rendell says he would use $900 million of the additional revenue over the next two years to lower property taxes for homeowners. That would be in addition to property tax relief of up to $1 billion expected in about two years, when all 14 casinos are open.

If I am reading these paragraphs correctly, $450 million per year out of the $1.4 billion per year in additional sales tax revenue will be used to reduce property taxes. This will marginally harm me, but I think that the shifting composition of taxes will be a fundamental wash for me, plus or minus fifty dollars for the year. However when we apply basic median voter analysis, this move makes a lot more sense.

The typical homeowner is a little bit older, and a little more likely to vote than the general population. Most groups of homeowners will see a small net negative — a little more in sales tax, and and slightly less on the property taxes. However there is one group that has a signifcantly different asset-income-consumption pattern that this plan is targetting and they dominate the vote.

The retired homeowner will receive the most benefits from this plan. Most retired homeowners are on a reduced income compared to the income streams they received while they were working. However home prices, and therefore property values and taxes have increased [assume reasonable assessment practices here... I know, a big assumption]. So under this system, a larger and larger proportion of their income is going to property taxes. However retired individuals have a higher proportion of their income already going to sales tax free services and goods such as medical care. So an increase in the sales tax will have a smaller net effect on them then the general population.

This policy provides some positive benefits for the median voter while continuing the wealth and policy transfer of power from the young to the old.

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Here we go again

Created: January 31st, 2007 | Written By: fester

It is amazing how fast the wardrums against Iran are beating.  Just
this morning CNN was breathlessly reporting that Iranian special forces
were behind the snatch and grab operation in Karbala that killed 5 US
soldiers.  Quietly and quickly they noted that this was just a theory
with minimal evidence beyond the fact that the raid was well planned
and conducted.  And then they went straight back towards how
sophisticated the Iranian operation may have been.  The news is heating
up and more examples are popping up.

Via the Spork in the Drawer, is this article in the LA Times on Iran:

The efforts could include more forceful patrols by Air Force and Navy
fighter planes along the Iran-Iraq border to counter the smuggling of
bomb supplies from Iran, a senior Pentagon official said……

Thomas G. McInerney, a retired Air Force lieutenant general who
advocates military strikes in Iran, said U.S. planes along the border
could be better used to keep bomb-making materials out of Iraq.

"We know they are doing this. Why do we accept it?" McInerney said. "For every [improvised explosive device] that goes off in Iraq, a bomb should go off in Iran."  [Emphasis added.]

  My buddy Cernig repeatedly notes that there is minimal evidence of significant evidence of Iranian smuggling of weapons into Iraq.  Instead most weapons are either manufactured locally, being bought on the black market, stolen from Iraqi government armories, creatively lost by militia members and found by fellow militia members, or recovered from the vast number of unguarded ammunition dumps. 

British forces that have been operating on the Iraq-Iran border in an anti-smuggling/border security mission are seeing next to no evidence of significant smuggling activities in their sectors.  And these units are light infantry units that can actually patrol and cover ground.  The United States knows that occassional aerial reconnascance flights are unlikely to detect or deter any small scale smuggling activities, so unless there are multiple dozen truck convoys going across the Iraq-Iran border carrying visible rocket launchers, these flights will do nothing to stop the small scale smuggling that exists.  Instead, they are most likely another provocation and potentiallity of ‘going off course’ will be a constant potential ratcheting of tensions between the United States and Iran.

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I’m back

Created: January 31st, 2007 | Written By: fester

Sorry for my long absence from Comments from Left Field. I had been registered to blog via my blogger account for Fester’s Place before Mike invited me to blog here. Fester’s Place on Blogger just was transferred over to Blogger 2.0. Until this morning I was unable to log into Comments to post.

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Clap Harder

Created: December 13th, 2006 | Written By: fester

US News and World Report is reporting that President Bush is looking to go "big" in Iraq in next month’s speech on a new policy:

"senior administration officials" who suggested Bush wants more time because he "is planning to do something big" namely, he is "very seriously considering agreeing with John McCain and increasing troop levels." In fact, the Los Angeles Times reports on its front page that "strong support has coalesced in the Pentagon behind a military plan to ‘double down’ in the country with a substantial buildup in…troops, an increase in industrial aid and a major combat offensive against Muqtada Sadr, the radical Shiite leader impeding development of the Iraqi government." The Times also notes that strategy would overlap "somewhat a course promoted by" McCain. And the Washington Times says "top military officials with whom Mr. Bush met yesterday backed Mr. McCain’s stance."

The only US combat units that are available for a surge operation into Iraq are the units currently in Iraq.  Units will be getting orders to extend their deployments from twelve months to sixteen, seventeen, eighteen months, while the units that were supposed to replace them will instead come in on schedule, or slightly ahead of schedule and fight side by side with the units they were suppose to replace. 

This constraint limits the size of the force to an additional four or five brigades above baseline, or roughly one division.

President Bush indicates that he wants this force to take on both the Mahdi Army and reinitiate the fight in Anbar Province against the Sunni Arab insurgencies.  However the problem is that an additional four or five brigades is only 25,000 troops or so, and this is not enough manpower for either problem.  The Washington Post reported in September that commanders in both Anbar and Baghdad were calling for an extra division in each area.

Introducing a short term surge of American forces into an area will do next to nothing about the violence trend line.  There have been several other temporary surges that have not successfully dampened the insurgency; instead as soon as US troops withdraw and Iraqi forces ‘take over’ security, the violence ramps right back and the situation continues to deterioriate.   The war is lost, and the ability of the United States to influence events on the ground in a manner that is favorable to US interests (define that as you may) is and has been consistently decreasing.  Another 20,000 troops, or 30,000 troops or 60,000 troops for six months will not change this dynamic.

It is time to leave, and to learn how we collectively made and endorsed this horrendous series of decisions.  That is the best that we can do today.

 

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Why I dislike Barnett

Created: December 8th, 2006 | Written By: fester

Thomas Barnett is one freaking smart dude. That is obvious. And it is also obvious that he has the ear of quite a few people who can make decisions at the national level. However I have a very hard time buying into his seriousness at times, and a post at his blog today illustrates why. But before I go further, let me give you a basic gloss of his views:

His basic idea is that this era of globalization, vastly cheaper communication devices, trade and the flattening of decision making structures is a positive feedback process. From the initial startpoint, there were few free and fairly free countries and regions throughout the world, but the benefits of opening up to the international economy makes countries and global elites want to syncronize their internal rule sets to market and global rule sets that promote initially stability and then secondarily liberty. And this process has been going on for a while and has been pretty successful so now the world can be divided into three groups: the old Core, led by the United States and composed of the Cold War Western Alliance (including Japan, ANZAC and others), the new Core being led by China and India, and then the GAP — most of the resource and rent extraction countries of the Middle East, most of Africa — that barely benefit from globalization, and in some cases are actively hostile to the rule sets that govern other countries.

Okay, up to this point, this is a rehash of Wallenstein combined with a bit of neo-classical economics and Tom Friedman thrown in for some flavor. I have no big problems with this. The problem I have is with his prescription and impatience.

He wants to accelerate the integration of the New Core into the Old Core’s with a synthesized common rule set, AND also bring the GAP into the Core’s synthesized rule set. And he is willing to use a shitload of military force to do this. His idea is to have the US provide the ass-kicking force (much like the US did in Iraq or during the air campaign in Kosovo) while the rest of the Core take care of the peacemaking and keeping process. He does not have a whole lot of faith in the rest of the Core stepping up to support US invasions for either political or capability reasons, so he wants the US military to transform itself from an asskicking Leviathon force to a Systems Adminstration force that can rebuild GAP countries to becoming functioning members of the Core. From here, he figures that demonstration strikes against the ‘rogue’ GAP nation will encourage other GAP members to hasten their process of integration out of fear and motivated self-interest. He argues that Libya’s agreement to stop and dismantle its limited nuclear, chemical and biological weapons program is proof that this works in the real world. He sees it as proof because the demolition of Iraq during the invasion, and subsequently supposedly put fear into Quadaffi and his top leadership cadre that they could be next on the list. And for this reason, among others, Thomas Barnett was and still is a supporter of the decision to invade Iraq.

Your [President Bush's] big-bang strategy to reform the Middle East took down Saddam, which was good; you’ve completely screwed up the Iraq occupation, which is bad; and now you don’t seem to know exactly where you\’re going, which is not so great……

I know, I know. If the mullahs are so weak and scared, then why do they reach so obviously for the bomb?

Look at it from their perspective, Mr. President. Those scary neocons just toppled regimes to Iran’s right (Afghanistan) and left (Iraq), and ourmilitary pulled off both takedowns with ease. Moreover, your administration has demonstrated beyond all doubt that you don’t fear leaving behind a god-awful mess in your war machine’s wake. Frankly,youre as scary as Nixon was in his spookiest White House moments on Vietnam.


So he still thinks that Iraq is producing positive results, and he still supports the concept despite the fact that he admits the occupation and counterinsurgency is screwed up beyond all belief. And part of this screw-up of the occupation as he sees it is because the US military has not transformed itself into his desired System Administration force of linguists and special forces and civil affairs officers who can effectively embed themselves into a foreign society and then do ‘good.’ Another part of this failure as he diagnosises it is the betrayal of the Core’s great mission by the rest of the core (excluding Great Britian) by their refusal to provide troops to be bullet sponges. And he knew that these problems were present by February 2003. And yet he still thinks the invasion of Iraq was a good idea.

With the release of the Baker-Hamilton Report official Washington is finally recognizing reality. The war in Iraq has been lost, and Bush is an incompetent to boot. I do not expect any significant policy changes as the political incentives are not there yet to dictate change, which is an argument made by Matt Taibi in Rolling Stone. [h/t Ian Welsh @ the Agonist.] More of the same has not worked, and will not work. There are no more troops sustainabily available, and the pittance of forces that are available for short surges have not demonstrated in the past an ability to due any more than cause a geographic relocation of violence without disturbing the trendlines. Bruce R at Flit has the graphs, the math and the data to back this point up:



Iraq civilian violence levels are relatively unswayed by changes in U.S. force levels. The two remain, in this comparison, independent variables, with any connection being a fairly transitory one. Again, this pattern might not hold if there were to be a much larger sudden increase in troop levels (50,000-plus), but smaller (10-25,000 size) troop strength increases and decreases appear to have had little lasting impact on the trend up until now.


So what is Dr. Barnett’s response that makes me question his seriousness:


But it’s realistic: it’s really “pullback; not pullout,” because this is all about U.S. casualties.

Yes, we hear all about caring for Iraqi deaths, but let’s be honest: Americans don’t care about that and never did.

When American casualties go down, Iraqi ones will rise even more,and the same people who long castigated Rummy on too few troops can summarily ignore the results of this new , more drastic “tough love” version of the same.

And I’m sure way too few troops will accomplish what too few troops couldn’t.

Wish Bush had been smart enough to bring enough of the right (i.e.,New Core ) allies instead of too few of the wrong kind (the fragile,glass-jawed Old Core)? We all do.

Think we would have had to “give up”; or “offer too much”?

Care to recalculate those costs today?


Wahhaa, WAAAAA WAAAA — those dirty hippies don’t want to get drafted for a grand strategist’s brilliant multigenerational ideas that has to be right because it was thought up by the GRAND STRATEGIST HIMSELF and the marginal troop changes that are possible have done jack shit to create stability. So they want to insist on doing something different and minimizing total costs on a fucking fiasco of great proportions. WAAA WAAA

And then he whines about reality on the single minded, arrogant, nationalistic focus of George W. Bush which has been evident since before he was President and how he screwed up this briliant idea of Dr. Barnett’s.

I am sorry, I just do not find this response to be serious.

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Occassionally I am right

Created: December 6th, 2006 | Written By: fester

Every now and then, it is nice to see outside confirmation that I can occassionally get things right. Newsweek in an article on Iraq’s political and security arrangements has an interesting nugget:

A four-star general who declined to be identified discussing a confidential conversation told of this encounter with Gen. Peter Chiarelli, who was in charge of day-to-day ground operations. “Do you have enough forces? Enough to clear an area and stay there to secure it 24/7?” Chiarelli replied, “Of course not.” The four-star recalls replying, “It’s going to fail, it’s absolutely going to fail.” The Americans never had enough forces to sweep even half the city, much less secure it.

When I first wrote about Operation Forward Together, I noted that the counter-insurgent ratio to population sucked, and that this dismal ratio would do little to halt Baghdad’s slide towards chaos.

So either Operation Forward Together is just a big chomp and stomp raid as the forces involved are too small to be successful throughout the entire city or it is a targetted operation against Sunni Arab neighborhoods. If it is the latter case, the mole starts moving elsewhere to be whacked, and it acts as further confirmation of the belief in the Sunni Arab population that the political process is designed to screw them over.

So great progress will be proclaimed. Impressive press conferences with seemingly large caches of ‘insurgent’ weaponry will shown. There will be a short term dip in violent attacks in Baghdad, but no real change nationwide, and in three months, Baghdad continues its downward spiral.

The biggest thing I was wrong about in my predictions from June was that Operation Forward Together could produce a postive but temporary deviation from the downward sloping trend towards disorder. It did not even change the trendlines.

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A Simple reminder on Metrics

Created: November 28th, 2006 | Written By: fester

Metrics are useful things as they convey concise information and allow comparisons between actual and ideal situations fairly easily. However they are easily manipulated. Housing Bubble Casualty notes how the California Association of Realtors is playing with their metrics:

The minimum household income first-time buyers needed to purchase a home at $478,710 in California in the third quarter of 2006 was $98,890, based on an adjustable interest rate of 6.58 percent and assuming a 10 percent down payment. First-time buyers typically purchase a home equal to 85 percent of the prevailing median price. The monthly payment including taxes and insurance was $3,300 for the third quarter of 2006.
—————-

First off, the OLD standard used to be 20% down and a FIXED rate loan. Now, they are using 10% down and an ADJUSTABLE rate loan. Looks like the ole “when things aren’t looking as good as we think they should, we will just change the standard”. It has been used successfully with SAT scores, so why not housing stats? After all, if we just change the ’standard’ every so often, we can show progress with each new ’standard’. Don’t believe me…here is the link to a report from December 2005 that uses the ‘old’ 20% down standard: The ‘OLD’ affordability index from 2005. Here is the excerpt:

—————-
LOS ANGELES (Dec. 8 ) – The percentage of households in California able to afford a median-priced home stood at 15 percent in October, a 4 percentage-point decrease compared with the same period a year ago when the Index was at 19 percent, according to a report released today by the California Association of REALTORS® (C.A.R.). The October Housing Affordability Index (HAI) was unchanged from September, when it stood at 15 percent.

The minimum household income needed to purchase a median-priced home at $538,770 in California in October was $128,480, based on an average effective mortgage interest rate of 6.03 percent and assuming a 20 percent downpayment.

A second institution that is playing with its metrics to make their poor results look better is the US Army. Military.com is reporting that the US Army is taking in significantly more recruits with only a GED instead of a high school diploma. However due to a quirk in the rules, or a specific exemption, these new recruits are excluded from several important force quality measures. This exclusion coincidentlally makes the public affairs officer’s job a whole lot easier.

The Two Tier Attrition Screen (TTAS) is an added quality indicator that officials hope will allow the Army take in many more high school dropouts……….

In fiscal 2006, which ended Sept. 30, the Army brought in 5900 non-high school graduates as TTAS (pronounced T-TAS) recruits. Not only do such recruits help the Army reach its numerical recruiting goals but the Army can exclude these recruits when calculating the percentage of high school diploma graduates recruited, which is an important quality measure.

For example, the Army announced last month that 81 percent of its non-prior service recruits for 2006 were high school graduates. That was disturbingly below the 90 percent Department of Defense standard for every service. But the proportion of high school graduates would have been reported as 74.3 percent if the Army had to count the 5900 TTAS enlistees high school dropouts. The number instead is ignored.

In March, Defense officials gave the Army permission to sign up 8000 TTAS recruits a year to ease increasingly difficult recruiting challenges.

Metrics can be powerful tools, but in these two cases, they can be extemely misleading for people who look at the final number and not the process that produced the number. Just beware when you read reports that you understand how the numbers are created and potentially massaged.

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Where are the brigades?

Created: November 16th, 2006 | Written By: fester

Just saw this over at Steve Gilliard’s blog, from the Guardian:

Point one of the strategy calls for an increase rather than a decrease in overall US force levels inside Iraq, possibly by as many as 20,000 soldiers. This figure is far fewer than that called for by the Republican presidential hopeful, John McCain. But by raising troop levels, Mr Bush will draw a line in the sand and defy Democratic pressure for a swift drawdown.

The reinforcements will be used to secure Baghdad, scene of the worst sectarian and insurgent violence, and enable redeployments of US, coalition and Iraqi forces elsewhere in the country.

20,000 more US troops to Baghdad are a drop in the bucket. Assuming Baghdad’s population is 5.8 million people, that is an increase in the counterinsurgent force of 3.5 counterinsurgents/thousand residents. When I first wrote about Operation Forward Together, the counterinsurgent ratio of the planned for force was roughly 13 counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents. This number was predicated upon the designated Iraqi Army and police units actually showing up for duty. They did not do that.

So as we see unicorns prance down Haifa Street, and the Iraqi Army shows up as a combat ready and loyal to a unified, non-sectarian national government in Baghdad, the maximum counterinsurgent ratio, even with this one last surge is roughly 16.5 counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents. That sounds like a lot. But it is not. The US Army has repeatedly noted that stability operations, which are less manpower intensive than active counter-insurgeny operations, need a higher force ratio. The British were able to put down the Malay Insurgency and the IRA with force ratios approaching 20 counter insurgents per 1,000 population. So I believe an extra three or four brigades for a one year tour in Baghdad will just be exposing 20,000 more US soldiers to a high risk of death, permanent injury and PTSD without any relevant probability of success.

More pragmatically, the relevant question is where do these three or four brigades come from? General Pace recently made some comments about the desired force posture for the US military:

Pace said the benchmark he’d like to see on the active force is a one-year deployment, followed by two years at home station before deploying again. For Guardsmen and reservists, the ideal would be five years at home between one-year deployments, he said.

Efforts under way are helping make this goal achievable,………

These initiatives will provide 18 to 19 Army brigades, as well as one or two Marine regimental combat brigades, ready to deploy at any given time. Pace said this would ensure “a sustainable tempo” for troops that matches his deployment benchmarks.

The problem for now, he said, is that current operations require 25 brigade-size units at a time.

There is a deviation between reality of a fifteen brigade force in Iraq today, along with Afghanistan, former Yugoslavia, Korea and other committments and what the force structure can deliver. More importantly, we are currently in a local minimum for force availiabilty. National Guard units were heavily used in 2004 and 2005 to provide some breathing room for the active duty formations. These National Guard units should not be available for another two to three years. The activte duty forces are shouldering the vast majority of the combat load right now.

The deviation from desired and actual availability of forces is being addressed in a couple of different ways. The most public is the extension of two extra brigades to spend fifteen or sixteen months in Iraq to provide some surge capacity. The more common, but slightly quieter method that the Pentagon is using to find extra brigades is to dramatically reduce ‘dwell’ time. Units get home from Iraq, send their equipment to the depots for maitenance, go on leave, and then get ready to go back to Iraq a year later now. Finally, the National Guard is being prepared to send at least four combat brigades back to Iraq at least one year earlier than these units had anticipated. The Marine Corps Reserve is also being asked to send combat units back to Iraq for a second combat tour. These steps are being taken because there are no uncommitted and rested combat formations available.

These extraordinary measures are being taken on the assumption that the baseline force is roughly fifteen brigade equivilants with the occassional short term deviation. Finding three or four brigades for the LAST BIG PUSH [h/t Kevin Drum] is fantastical at best. These units can be found in the following manner:

  1. Extend the tours of four or five brigades for an extra six months while moving their replacements in on time or a little ahead of schedule.
  2. Crunch the dwell time of all active duty US based formations to less than 1 year, and send these tired units back to Iraq.
  3. Mobilize four or more additional National Guard brigades beyond the four that have already been notified for early deployments. This means National Guard units will have only thirty to thirty-six months of rest between deployments.
  4. Drawdown the end strength in Afghanistan or extend current units tours by six to twelve months. Then shift the units slotted as replacements for Afghanistan to go to Iraq.
  5. Pull out of Yugoslavia entirely and send the 1.5 low tier National Guard brigades that are commited to that mission to Iraq.
  6. Pray for unicorns.
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Reducing Lieberman’s Leverage

Created: November 8th, 2006 | Written By: fester

Joe Lieberman (narcistists for CT) is looking to continue his core political competency of extracting political rent from the Democratic Party to his own positions. Hey, he won the election, that is his right, but the Democratic Party has a few simple tools it can use to reduce Lieberman’s leverage. The most important point is that this leverage position is short term, no more than two years. There is a reasonable probability that the window of extortion will be narrower than that.

Assuming that both Virginia and Montana are declared Democratic wins in the next couple of days, the 51st caucusing Democrat is the marginal decision maker with significant influence in the agenda. This is an unstable equilibrium of power that can be significantly stabilized in a couple of different manners.

1) A credible promise from Harry Reid, backed up by the money folks on and off line that disloyalty will result in backbench exile along with complete loss of seniority in 2008. Mark Schmidt at TAPPED looks at the initial outline of the 2008 Senate landscape:

These are the Senators of Class II, those whose seats will be up in 2008. There are 12 Democrats, and 21 Republicans…..The only vulnerable Dem in the class is Mary Landrieu of Louisiana…..That’s seven possible pick-ups in 2008, plus three more that could be picked up with the right candidate. And what if Harold Ford runs against Lamar Alexander in Tennessee? What if Susan Collins in Maine draws a strong opponent? What about Elizabeth Dole, whose image of competence is as shattered as Dick Cheney’s? That’s thirteen seats the Republicans have to worry about either a little or a lot. And almost no potential for gains.

2) An enticement for a GOP Senator to switch caucuses even if not switching parties. The basic enticement is that the landscape north of Virginia and east of the Ohio/PA border is going to be as toxic for statewide Republicans in the next couple of cycles as the Deep South has been for Democrats over the previous two cycles. And therefore switching over to run effectively unopposed is a lot easier than raising $15-$20 million dollars and banking on the advantages of incumbency to get re-elected to support a party that is against your constiuent’s interests. Getting to the 52nd seat makes the counter defection pointless.

3) Wait for a Senator with an opposite party governor to die or resign. Given the age of some of the Senators, this is a decent chance for a control flip.

Unfortunately Joe Lieberman will be in the Senate on Jan. 3, 2007, but he should be functionally irrelevant by 2009.

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Canvassing Updates

Created: November 1st, 2006 | Written By: fester

Okay just a couple of quick things on Get out the Vote:

Hard money candidate advocacy canvassing opportunity opening up this weekend helping out Jason Altmire win over Missy Hart.

They’re looking for people to do at least 2 days min 6 hrs/day @$12/hr. The max is 4 days at 11 hours per day.

When: Saturday, Nov. 4 – Tuesday, Nov. 7
Call: 412-721-8707 (Ask for John)
Email: canvass4change@gmail.com

(Paid for by SEIU COPE. www.seiucope.org Not authorized by any candidate or candidate’s committee)

[h/t to 2 Political Junkies for the formatting]

Second, the weather looks like it will be cooperating with us this weekend. From the Weater Channel:

I’ll have my wool socks and UnderArmor on for the first couple days of the fifty hours or so of canvassing I am scheduled for, but Monday and Tuesday look like great days for voting.

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As they stand up, we stand down Watch Part MCM

Created: October 27th, 2006 | Written By: fester

I actually read through Central Command’s press releases as this is an interesting source to see an angle of what is going on. A couple of days ago, an insurgent group ambushed an Iraqi police column and inflicted twenty five dead and twenty or so wounded Iraqi police. Here is the Centcom press release on the incident:

The police under fire fought back in intense house to house fighting.

An element from 1-68 Combined Arms Battalion, 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, Task Force Lightning, was diverted from another mission and rapidly responded to reinforce the IPs in contact.

The reaction force consisted of ground and air elements; they engaged the AIF immediately upon arrival.

Iraqi and Coalition forces engaged AIF with direct fire, killing 18 AIF, wounding eight and capturing 27 more. Additionally, enemy weapons and ammunition were captured.

One Iraqi civilian and 24 IPs were killed in action. Seven IPs were wounded and transported to FOB Warhorse for medical treatment.

Let us assume that the Centcom version of the story is 100% true. It is still not a good story if we look at the underlying data.

First, Centcom is claiming there were at least 51 insurgents involved in the attack. This confirms that the insurgency is very comfortable operating in at least large platoon sized groups, but more likely company sized groups of 100-200 men at a time in the open as it is very rare for an entire unit to be eliminated.

Secondly, the Iraqi police are still dogmeat when faced with a determined attack. They have been dogmeat for last year, and the year before that, and the year before that. A counterinsurgent force needs to be able to inflict 5:1 or better casualties to be making significant military progress against an insurgency, and in this situation, the counterinsurgent force was able to inflict a little less than a 2:1 loss rate on the insurgent attack force.

Finally, this quasi-favorable ratio was only achieved with the intervention of heavily armed and armored American forces. The reaction force was from a heavy mechanized infantry brigade which means either tanks or infantry fighting vehicles backed up by attack choppers. Yet the insurgent force was able to break contact with heavy but acceptable casualties.

Remember, the Iraqi military that is supposed to stand up and replace American troops does not have any air support more powerful than a guy pissing out the back of a Cessna, remember, the Iraqi Army has a double handful of thirty year old tanks that are notably vulnerable to light anti-tank weapons that are more common than snow in Buffalo.

So three year into the process of standing up Iraqi police and military units and a continued campaign designed to pressure and fragment insurgent operational ability and we still have company sized insurgent attacks that would have shattered an equivilant sized Iraqi government security unit except for the intervention of very heavy US units.

The strategy still ain’t working.

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PA-14 House Activism

Created: October 20th, 2006 | Written By: fester

Okay, we are in the final stretch, and Democrats look like they are in
pretty good shape for the House, and a bit tougher shape for the
Senate. One of the reasons that Democrats are in good shape for the
House is that the list of winnable seats still seems to be expanding.
To continue this expansion, second and third tier campaigns need
resources, and resources means money for the next two weeks and
volunteers for the last week.

However since these races are second and third tier races, the
organizational capacity to quickly raise money is most likely lacking,
so these candidates will be reliant on national coordinated campaign
money, which means either DNC or DCCC money. One of the easiest
sources of additional DCCC money is from Democratic incumbents who
have significant cash on hand and either no challenger or a token
challenger.

Mike Doyle is one of these incumbents. According to Open
Secrets
, Congressman Doyle has roughly $280,000 cash on hand as of
Sept. 30, 2006.

Please call his campaign office at 412-244-9101 and ask him to
transfer a portion of his current cash on hand to the DCCC in order to
help fund more competive and marginal races. Additionally thank him
for his current support for the DCCC as he has already overpaid his DCCC dues.

,

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Fester’s Work Update

Created: October 17th, 2006 | Written By: fester

As of this afternoon I have started doing some paid GOTV/voter identification work for America Votes-Pennsylvania SW PA office. I’ll be doing this until the election and maybe a day or two after that. Just to be sure that I am not violating any disclosure agreements, election laws or confidences, I will not be writing any further on any race that is going on in Pennsylvania at the Federal, State or Local level. I am being way too cautious here, but I rather make a negative mistake and not a positive mistake.

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Enjoying the write-offs

Created: October 16th, 2006 | Written By: fester

I have been getting more and more optimistic about the upcoming election as Republican strategic behavior is mimicing the strategic behavior of the Democrats in 2000, 2002, and 2004 where as the election draws ever closer, the weaker party is falling back ever closer to their core in an attempt to conserve resources for the most effecively marginal races.

Political Wire is reporting that the NRSC is writing off their chances to defend incumbent Mike DeWine (R-OH) and shifting their resources to Missouri, Tennessee and Virginia. This move will save them significant bundles of cash, but it also saves the DSCC and other Democratic leaning marginal money/late infusion groups significant sums of cash that can be partially shifted southward. And this year, the tactical retreat may not be buying the GOP much breathing room, for as Kevin Drum notes from a Wall Street Journal report the GOP has relied on vastly superior funding to eke out narrow wins but this year the funding gaps are comparatively miniscule between the two parties.

So right now it looks like the GOP has written off Santorum and DeWine, has reduced its committment to Burns and Chaffee and is seeking only one pick-off attempt in New Jersey which is a Democratic state in a Democratic year. I am liking this shrinking GOP field.

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Finding 15 brigades a year

Created: October 11th, 2006 | Written By: fester

MSNBC is reporting the following:

WASHINGTON - The U.S. Army has plans that would keep the current level of troops in Iraq — about 15 brigades — through 2010, the top Army officer said Wednesday.

The Army chief of staff, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, cautioned that people not read too much into the planning, because it is easier to pull back forces than to get units prepared and deployed at the last minute.

So how can this be done if the current effort to keep fifteen brigades in Iraq is causing so much strain and forcing units to compress their reconstitution time while other units are seeing fourteen, fifteen and sixteen month tours of duty? That is a good question.

There are a couple of methods that the US Army will be able to find a little bit of additional breathing room. The largest source of new brigades that are available for deployment is from the deployment clocks resetting on some of the National Guard brigades that have already done one combat deployment to Iraq. Two infantry brigades (1 from Florida, another from Indiana) will be eligible for redeployment starting in the fall of 2008, and then over the next two years, at least an additional twelve National Guard brigades will be available for their second combat tour. So what will happen is the 2009-2010 tour will look a lot alike the 2004-2005 OIF-3 tour where roughly half the combat units were National Guard units. That tour gave the US Army significant breathing room at the cost of wrecking the Guard units.

The next source of new units that are available is from shuffling of slots and organizational requirements that have increased the number of active duty brigades from 33 in 2003 to 42 today. These modular brigades are smaller and place more emphasis on technology than boots. For high intensity combat operations this may not matter, but in counterinsurgency and security missions, manpower is critical. Most importantly, these redesigned brigades tend to have two combat maneuver battalions assigned to them instead of the traditional three maneuver battalions assigned to brigades in 2003. So the force pool of combat battalions in 2003 was roughly 99 combat battalions, to 84 battalions under the new configuration.

There is one caveat to the modularization increase of combat brigades and that is the Army is stretching out the conversion schedule and reducing the total number of National Guard brigades.

Converting a three battalion brigade with support from the division HQ to a modular brigade with two battalions and intergral support elements is at least a year long process, so some brigades will be knocked off the availability list.

The next reasonable spot for more deployable troops is from the converted Stryker intermediate combat brigade teams. The US Army has spent the past couple of years taking a combat brigade off of the available list, shipping all of their equipment to depot, and replacing the configuration with the Styker family of vehicles. Once this happens, the Army trained the reformed units and then they became available again. This process knocked one to three brigades out a year for the past three years. It is pretty much wrapping up right now.

So there are three reasonable sources of where the US Army gains a little bit of breathing room and capability to maintain the Iraq occupation force. However these new units are not enough to allow the US Army to reset back to a one year in, two years out rotation system for a force of at least thirteen Army, and two Marine brigade equivilants. So that means at least several of the units that are going into Iraq with only twelve to eighteen months after their last deployment will do another year in Iraq, and only get twelve to fifteen months of rest before they redeploy back to a combat zone.

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Categorizing potential Dem pick-ups and future thinking

Created: October 10th, 2006 | Written By: fester

It is looking more and more likely that the Democrats will win a majority in the House of Representatives. The national mood is solidly against Republicans, solidly against Bush, and so far the public seems to be buying into the Democratic credible promise of oversight and adult supervision of the really dumb ideas from the Bush administration. The Foley cover-up meltdown has only confirmed in the public’s mind that the Republican Party stands solely for power at this time, and therefore does not deserve to wield power. Things are looking good, so I will again attempt to make myself look like an idiot and think about a potential future.

As I see it, there are five groups of seats that the Democrats have a strong chance of winning. These seats will have different profiles in the probability of short and long term re-election rates, and they will also have different preferred policy portfolios.

1) GOP held seats in Blue districts — the CT Three, the Philly belt for top tier, NH-2 for a second tier race — are the most obvious examples of seats that are trending solidly blue, and moderate Republicans are fighting against the national tide this year. Symbolic fights and good constituent service combined with lots of funding would normally be enough for these Republicans to escape defeat, but this could be a smaller analogue of 1994’s treatment of conservative Southern Democrats for these Northeastern moderate Republicans.

2) Traditional swing seats such as Indiana-8 where both parties have this seat circled on their challenge map for the past three cycles and the next eight cycles. Lots of money, lots of advertising, and strong candidates that are guaranteed to produce attritional slugfests which will define the national mood.

3) Time for a change seats that are marginally conservative (PA-10, PA-4) but have decent Democratic strength. Good campaigns combined with the incumbent screwing things up are needed for significant gains in these seats, but if Democrats win, these seats are the padding to a majority.

4) What the hell seats such as Wyoming At-Large, and Idaho 1 where the GOP nominates weak candidates and are relying on institutional and infrastructure advantages against an energized and fresh Democratic opposition.

5) No way in hell am I voting for that bastard seats — TX-22, NY-24, FL-16 — These seats look to be likely Democratic pick-ups due to monumental screw-ups, indictable offenses and generally poor judgement of the Republican incumbents.

These five categories are how I see the potential pick-ups for Democrats this November. Some seats fit into more categories than one. For instance PA-10 is a conservative district with a Republican entrenched in a mistress choking scandal so it can be categorized as 75% #3 and 25% #5.

The Democratic Party’s incumbent base is pretty strong as they survived the tough years of 2002 and 2004. The incumbents have won election and re-election in very strong anti-Democratic years. So the question is if the Democrats pick up a majority, how do they defend that majority in future elections.

Democrats who knock off Republicans who hold blue districts (group #1) are the easiest candidates to protect in future elections. Run as generic to liberal clean government Democrats who are in favor of the Democratic Party acting as an opposition party, and these future incumbents should see a high re-election rate.

Good constituent service, good campaigning and an ability to bring home the bacon is one strategy for Democratic incumbents who just won in swing seats. I don’t think that the Democratic Party can reshape the national mood and sub-group identification that drives voter preference and participation enough in a short enough time to provide significant issue based protection for these individuals. Another strategy is to adapt the Republican practice of seeing a 218-217 vote as an ideal vote as that would allow several vulnerable Democrats to hide on controversial issues. This group over the intermediate to long term (3+ cycles) need to move the current group of swing races into solid Democratic seats, so that the third group of races are the new swingable races.

The third group is the toughest group to predict on how to protect. Here I believe basic accountability and a strong committment to oversight would work pretty well. Avoid the social conservative redmeat issues that some Democrats and liberal pundits believe can be used to buy peace. For instance, ignore William Salentan of Slate’s advice to trash the practicality of reproductive rights even while mouthing platitudes towards keeping them legal. This strategy has been a failed strategy of appeasement. Look for wedge issues such as the 95-10 abortion reduction strategy to seperate the hardcore social conservatives from people who are actually concerned about pragmatic solutions. Stem cells has been a beautifully played wedge issue this cycle. This group will often need to be protected, and it will be a source of frustration to liberals, but I think that if we liberals remember this magical phrase “AGENDA SETTING POWER” we’ll be happy enough.

The fourth group is a bit easier to define a strategy but harder to defend as the institutional weakness of the Democratic Party is still a problem in the Mountain West. Keep away from the moralizing, keep away from bedroom issues, keep away from gun control, and continue the leave me alone/privacy policies. Also continue to promote the emerging environmental/outdoor user/sportsman alliances while encouraging short term increases in energy extraction under the guise of “energy independence” with a long term goal of changing the basis of energy within the US economy. Wilderness environmentalism v. pollution environmentalism is going to be a problem here. These are seats the Democrats if they win are going to have a relatively high attrition rate on.

The final group are the toughest seats to defend. These seats should be the top challenges for the GOP in 2008 as the districts tend to be pretty damn conservative with strong GOP machinery within them. I don’t think a whole lot can be done on the policy side besides allowing these Democrats to be on the losing side of a lot of close votes. These Democrats if they want to hold their seat have to know where every Social Security check is to be delivered and be able to call Grandma Millie on the 1st of the month to ensure that she got it.

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Defending Frist

Created: October 4th, 2006 | Written By: fester

I do not like Bill Frist. I will always vote against him, and volunteer against any camapaign that he runs which is within working distance from my house. However his recent statements about Afghanistan and the Taliban do make a certain degree of sense and therefore I have to defend him.

From Digby:

U.S. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist said Monday that the Afghan guerrilla war can never be won militarily and called for efforts to bring the Taliban and their supporters into the Afghan government.

The Tennessee Republican said he had learned from briefings that Taliban fighters were too numerous and had too much popular support to be defeated by military means.

“You need to bring them into a more transparent type of government,” Frist said during a brief visit to a U.S. and Romanian military base in the southern Taliban stronghold of Qalat. “And if that’s accomplished we’ll be successful…..”

“A political solution is how it’s all going to be solved,” he said.

This is not the most artful way of repeating US Army counterinsurgency doctrine (PDF)(h/t Politburo Diktat)

1-90. The primary objective of any counterinsurgent is to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate government. All governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Governments described as “legitimate” rule primarily with the consent of the governed, while those described as “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. Their citizens obey the state for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than because they voluntarily accept its rule. A government that derives its powers from the governed tends to be accepted by its citizens as legitimate. It still uses coercion — for example, against criminals — but the bulk of the population voluntarily accepts its governance.

Going back to the Daily Show interview with President/General Musharaff of Pakistan, he stated the obvious that the Taliban is fundamentally a Pashtun peoples movement with a heavily armed wing that is fighting what they perceive to be an illegimate government composed of a bunch of out-group warlords and protected by the US Army and NATO.

Walking the talk over to Iraq, that is one of the basic grievances of the Sunni Arab community — the new political arrangments imposed/protected by the US military are far less advantageous for them then the previous arrangments. Same basic complaint in Afghanistan without the complication of massive oil endowments to fight over. So when we applauded efforts to bring Sunnis into the Iraqi political process on the hope of fracturing the hardcore elements of the insurgency from their vital but persuadable support base, we were willing to bring an insurgency supporter into government.

That is what I think Frist is trying to communicate. A political solution with a military element has a higher probability of success than a purely military solution with minimal political efforts. Counterinsurgencies can be won by either committing genocide on a mass scale, or by fracturing the supporting coalition with credible and deliverable promises of addressing grievances while providing significant security.

I don’t like Frist but he is not saying anything that should not be part of a serious discussion of how to fight the insurgency that the United States has not yet completely screwed the pooch on.

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